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Note
Limiting Lender Liability: The Trend Toward
Written Credit Agreement Statutes
Todd C. Pearson
In 1979, Daniel and Marialys McClellan purchased Hybrid
Seeds, Inc.' Banc Midwest loaned the McClellans a large per-
centage of the purchase price and subsequently advanced addi-
tional funds for operations. 2 In 1985, the bank decided not to
extend any further credit to the McClellans and called all out-
standing loans.3 The McClellans sued Banc Midwest for breach
of contract 4 and fraud,5 alleging that the bank orally agreed to
finance the operation of Hybrid Seeds until the business be-
came profitable.6 This case typifies lender liability litigation.7
1. McClellan v. Banc Midwest, McLean County, 517 N.E.2d 762, 764 (III.
App. Ct. 1987), appeal denied, 526 N.E.2d 832 (Ill. 1988).
2. Id. at 765.
3. Id. at 766.
4. Id. at 764.
5. Id. at 765.
6. Id at 764-65. The court stated that a borrower could maintain a valid
cause of action for breach of an oral contract to lend money, id. at 764, but
dismissed the claim because the McClellans failed sufficiently to allege the in-
tended duration of the future line of credit, id. at 765. The court also upheld
the trial court's dismissal of the fraudulent misrepresentation claim because of
a failure to allege damages properly. Id. at 766.
7. The concept of lender liability has existed for many years. See, e.g.,
Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 64 P.2d 101, 105-106 (Ariz. 1937) (finding confi-
dential relationship existed when bank had served as customer's financial ad-
visor for 23 years and had represented that mortgage was for record keeping
and the bank would not foreclose); Earl Park State Bank v. Lowmon, 161 N.E.
675, 679 (Ind. Ct. App. 1928) (holding that bank breached its fiduciary duty by
persuading depositor to permit bank to loan his deposits to a third party with-
out revealing that the third party was insolvent and deeply indebted to bank).
However, lender liability litigation has increased dramatically in recent years,
largely because borrowers have been successful in obtaining large verdicts.
See, e.g., Landes Constr. Co. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 833 F.2d 1365, 1367 (9th
Cir. 1987) (awarding $18.5 million judgment); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.,
757 F.2d 752, 755 (6th Cir. 1985) (awarding $7.5 million judgment); State Nat'l
Bank of El Paso v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 699 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)
(awarding $18.6 million judgment); see also Pappone on the Lender Liability
Explosion, 1 BANKING L. REv. 12, 12 (1988) (interview with Michael J. Pap-
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A majority of states have recently added credit agree-
ments8 to their respective Statutes of Frauds9 in an attempt to
preclude borrowers from asserting claims similar to those the
McClellans pursued. This legislation, adopted in some form by
a majority of states within the past six years,10 requires that
pone) (arguing that publicity of large jury awards has attracted the attention
of the plaintiff's bar). Although a recognition of the recent increase in lender
liability litigation is important when assessing the intent of state legislatures
enacting credit agreement statutes, it is beyond the scope of this Note to pro-
vide a detailed background on lender liability law. For a comprehensive treat-
ment of lender liability, see generally HELEN D. CHAITMAN, THE LAW OF
LENDER LIABILITY (1990). For an introduction to lender liability, see generally
Werner F. Ebke & James R. Griffin, Lender Liability to Debtors: Toward A
Conceptual Framework, 40 Sw. L.J. 775 (1986); Frances E. Freund, Special Pro-
ject Note, Lender Liability: A Survey of Common-Law Theories, 42 VAND. L.
REV. 855 (1989).
8. The term "credit agreement" is used here generically and generally.
Many statutes define "credit agreement" explicitly. The Washington statute's
definition is one of the most detailed. It defines a "credit agreement" as:
an agreement, promise, or commitment to lend money, to otherwise
extend credit, to forbear with respect to the repayment of any debt or
the exercise of any remedy, to modify or amend the terms under
which the creditor has lent money or otherwise extended credit, to re-
lease any guarantor or consigner [cosigner], or to make any other fi-
nancial accommodation pertaining to a debt or other extension of
credit.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.36.100 (West Supp. 1991). In some states, the stat-
utes do not utilize the term "credit agreement," yet they cover similar types of
agreements. For example, California's statute applies to a "contract, promise,
undertaking, or commitment to loan money or to grant or extend credit."
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(g) (West Supp. 1991).
9. The Statute of Frauds requires certain types of contracts to be in writ-
ing to be enforceable. In 1677, the English Parliament enacted the original
Statute of Frauds. An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 1677, 29
Car. 2, ch. 3 (Eng.). In the United States, every state except Louisiana has
adopted a form of the Statute of Frauds. 4 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 567B (Walter H. E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1961) (provid-
ing a table of the statutes and noting that New Mexico adopted the Statute of
Frauds by judicial decision).
The Uniform Commercial Code also contains a Statute of Frauds for the
sale of goods. U.C.C. § 2-201. Section 2-201 of the UCC differs from the tradi-
tional Statute of Frauds, however, in many important ways. Most importantly,
§ 2-201 clearly relaxes the writing requirement. Under § 2-201, in order to be
valid, the writing must only "indicate that a contract for sale has been made
between the parties," be "signed by the party against whom enforcement is
sought," and indicate the quantity of goods sold. U.C.C. § 2-201; see also
Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Section 2-
201 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 26 VILL. L. REv. 63, 70-71 (1980)
(describing the relaxation of the writing requirement).
10. ALA. CODE § 8-9-2(7) (Supp. 1991) (effective May 3, 1989); ALASKA
STAT. § 09.25.010(a)(13) (Supp. 1991) (effective Aug. 9, 1989); APiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 44-101(9) (Supp. 1991) (approved 1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-101(d)-
(e) (Michie Supp. 1991) (effective Mar. 14, 1989); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(g)
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credit agreements be in writing to be enforceable. The remark-
able speed with which state legislatures have moved to enact
these statutes is a direct response to the dramatic increase in
the number of lender liability lawsuits during the past decade.'1
This Note provides an introduction to written credit agree-
ment statutes and explores the limited case law interpreting
these statutes. Part I examines the general rationale for adopt-
ing a writing requirement for credit agreements. Part II
surveys the various state approaches and then focuses on the
Minnesota credit agreement statute and cases decided under
the Minnesota statute. Finally, Part III discusses the future for
credit agreement statutes and explains how courts can benefit
from the cases decided under the Minnesota statute. This Note
concludes that courts should strictly apply the writing require-
ments these statutes adopt, but should realize that the statutes
should not affect some lender liability claims, such as fraud.
(West Supp. 1991) (effective Jan. 1, 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-10-124 (Supp.
1991) (effective Mar. 15, 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-550(a)(6) (West
Supp. 1991) (approved 1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2714(b) (Supp. 1990) (ef-
fective Mar. 29, 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.0304 (West 1990) (approved 1989);
GA. CODE ANN. § 13-5-30(7) (Michie Supp. 1991) (effective July 1, 1988); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 656-1(8) (Supp. 1991) (effective Jan. 1, 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
17, paras. 7101-03 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991) (effective Sept. 1, 1989); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 32.2.1.5-1 to -5 (Burns Supp. 1991) (effective July 1, 1989); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 535.17 (West Supp. 1991) (effective Jan. 1, 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 16-117 to -119 (1988) (effective Mar. 9, 1989); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 371.010(9) (Micbie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990) (effective July 13, 1990); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 6:1121-23 (West Supp. 1991) (approved 1989); MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-317 (1989) (effective July 1, 1989); MINN. STAT.
§ 513.33 (1990) (effective May 29, 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 432.045 (Vernon
Supp. 1991) (approved 1990); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 45-1,112 to -1,115 (Supp. 1990)
(effective July 10, 1990); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 111.220(4)-(5) (Michie Supp.
1991) (effective May 10, 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 25:1-5 (effective Apr. 4, 1991);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 586-5 (Michie 1991) (effective Mar. 1, 1990); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 22-5 (Supp. 1991) (effective Oct. 1, 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-06-04(4)-
(5) (Supp. 1991) (approved 1985; amended 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 140 (West Supp. 1992) (effective May 8, 1989); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 41.580(1)(h) (Butterworth Supp. 1990) (effective Oct. 3, 1989); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 53-8-2-(4) (1990) (approved 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-2-101(b)
(Supp. 1991) (approved 1989); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.02 (West
Supp. 1991) (effective Sept. 1, 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-4(6) (Supp. 1991)
(effective Apr. 24, 1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 11-2.9 (Michie Supp. 1991) (ap-
proved 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.36.110 to .140 (West Supp. 1991)
(effective July 1, 1990).
11. See, e.g., Colorado Adopts Bill to Limit Liability on Credit Agree-
ments, Rejects Branching, 52 BANKING REP. (BNA) No. 9, at 481 (Feb. 27, 1989)
[hereinafter Colorado Limits Liability] ("The Colorado Bankers Association
sought the legislation in response to the increased incidence of lender liability
claims based on oral agreements.").
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This approach is faithful to the general goal of credit agree-
ment statutes, namely to increase certainty in contractual lia-
bility as long as it is not at the expense of unwary borrowers.12
I. THE PURPOSES BEHIND WRITTEN CREDIT
AGREEMENT STATUTES
The purpose behind the original Statute of Frauds was to
prevent fraud.' 3 Despite critics' claims that the Statute of
Frauds is outdated 14 and the fact that credit agreements tradi-
12. See infra notes 18, 28 and accompanying text.
13. The English Parliament enacted the original Statute of Frauds to com-
bat "many fraudulent practices, which are commonly endeavored to be upheld
by perjury and subornation of perjury." An Act for Prevention of Frauds and
Perjuries, 1677, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3 (Eng.). In 1677 the potential for perjury and
fraud was considerably greater than it is today. In jury trials there were no
rules of evidence, and jurors were witnesses who often decided the facts based
on their own observations, not the evidence presented. See Hugh E. Willis,
The Statute of Frauds-A Legal Anachronism, 3 IND. L.J. 427, 429 (1928).
Moreover, parties to the case were not allowed to testify. Id.; see also 6 WIL-
LIAM S. HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 388-90 (3d ed. 1924). Writ-
ten evidence of a contract was extremely important under these
circumstances, given that a plaintiff could march into court and have a friend
testify to a feigned contract, which a defendant would be powerless to disprove
by his own testimony. See Lionel M. Summers, The Doctrine of Estoppel Ap-
plied to the Statute of Frauds, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 440, 441 (1931).
The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code had a similar anti-fraud
purpose in mind when they adopted a writing requirement for the sale of
goods. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-1, at 67 (3d ed. 1988) ("The Code draftsmen kept this writing requirement
largely because they saw it as a means to the end of combatting perjured testi-
mony in contract cases.").
14. Critics of the Statute of Frauds maintain that it promotes as much
fraud as it prevents. See, e.g., 2 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 275 (1950); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 13, § 2-8, at 92-94 (opinions of
Summers). This type of criticism of the Statute of Frauds is not a recent phe-
nomenon. See, e.g., Francis M. Burdick, A Statute for Promoting Fraud, 16
COLUM. L. REV. 273, 274 (1916) (arguing that the Statute of Frauds is rarely
invoked except to enable "a man to escape from the discussion of the question
of whether he has or has not been guilty of a deliberate fraud by breaking his
word"); Willis, supra note 13, at 429, 432 (arguing that the original reasons for
the Statute of Frauds no longer exist and no new reasons have developed).
Critics eventually persuaded the English Parliament that the Statute of
Frauds had outlived its usefulness and the Parliament repealed most of its
provisions in 1954. Law Reform Act, 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, ch. 34 (Eng.). The
reasons given include the maturation of evidentiary and jury procedures, the
Statute's propensity to promote fraud, the arbitrariness of types of contracts
covered, changes in business practices, and the amount of litigation fostered.
Marc A. Franklin, Note, Contracts: Statute of Frauds: Law Reform (Ezforce-
ment of Contracts) Ac 1954, 2 & 3 Elir 2, c. 34, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 581, 585-86
(1955) (citing Committee Report).
Modern Statute of Frauds' defenders include some of the most respected
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tionally have not been subject to the Statute of Frauds,15 a ma-
jority of states recently have enacted statutes that require
credit agreements be in writing to be enforceable.1 6 This trend
is motivated by a desire to stem what legislatures perceive as a
destructive increase in lender liability litigation.1 7 Unlike the
figures in commercial law. Professor Llewellyn argued that the degree of reli-
ance certain types of agreements induce justifies writing requirements in order
to provide predictable security about contractual liability. Karl N. Llewellyn,
What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 747 (1931).
Professor Llewellyn also asserted that the Statute of Frauds has encouraged
the idea that all contracts should be reduced to a writing. Id. He maintained
that, because of the sophistication of modern business practices, the Statute's
utility has actually increased over time. Id. ("[Tihe statute stands, in essence
better adapted to our needs than when it first was passed."). Professor White
defends the Statute on the basis that it continues to prevent fraud. WHrrE &
SUMMERS, supra note 13, § 2-8, at 94. In short, the defenders assert that the
Statute of Frauds reduces uncertainty in contractual liability, in addition to
preventing wholesale fraud. Llewellyn, supra, at 746-47.
Not surprisingly, opinions are not limited to total support for or opposition
to the Statute of Frauds. Some commentators advocate an intermediate posi-
tion. For example, one alternative is to require that the existence of an agree-
ment within the Statute meet a higher burden of proof. See Joseph M. Perillo,
The Statute of Frauds in the Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions of Form,
43 FORDHAM L. REv. 39, 74-77 (1974) (advocating a "dear and convincing stan-
dard" rather than the traditional "preponderance of evidence" standard); Sum-
mers, supra note 13, at 464 (suggesting application of a "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard). The ultimate issue then becomes whether it is quite clear a
contract was made, and not whether the technical requirements of the Statute
were met. Perillo, supra, at 75. Of course, a writing would go a long way to-
ward meeting that burden, and is therefore encouraged, but not absolutely re-
quired. Id. at 75-76.
Another alternative is to allow estoppel to be used to circumvent the Stat-
ute, but to limit any damage award to reliance damages. See Michael M. Carl-
son, Note, Promissory Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds in California, 66
CALIF. L. REv. 1219, 1242-55 (1978). The compromisers admit that the Statute
of Frauds continues to serve a useful function, but are troubled by the Stat-
ute's ability to create, rather than to remedy, injustice. They advocate a bal-
ancing of interests to allow equitable relief if justice demands it. Perillo,
supra, at 81-82.
15. The traditional Statute of Frauds, however, does require certain types
of loan documents be in writing. For example, some courts have held that
loan commitments secured by real estate fall within the Statute. See, e.g.,
Southern Indus. Banking Corp. v. Delta Properties, Inc., 542 S.W.2d 815, 817
(Tenn. 1976). Many states also include contracts "to answer for the debt of an-
other" within their Statute of Frauds. See, e.g., CALIF. CIV. CODE § 1624(b)
(West 1990). Moreover, the Uniform Commercial Code requires that personal
property security agreements be in writing. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(a).
16. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
17. The Florida legislature detailed the problem:
In the past, courts rarely witnessed cases in which a borrower, guar-
antor or other third party sought damages from a commercial lender
as a result of a lending transaction which experienced serious
problems. Today, major changes have occurred in the area of lender
1991]
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anti-fraud purpose of the original Statute of Frauds, the general
goal behind these credit agreement statutes is to increase cer-
tainty in contractual liability in order to reduce lender liability
litigation.1 8
liability, due primarily to two reasons. First, bank deregulation has
resulted in increased competitive pressures which has [sic] caused
lenders to restructure various traditional methods of financing. This
has had the impact of greatly increasing the potential liability of lend-
ers. Second, new theories of liability have been constructed by the
courts, and these theories are gaining wider acceptance.
... [T]he bill assists the legal system from unnecessary expenses
by reducing potential litigation arising out of attempts to prove or dis-
prove the existence of an oral or implied commitment to lend money
or forebear [sic] on a debt.
FLORIDA H.R. COMM. ON COMMERCE, STAFF ANALYSIS & ECONOMIC IMPACT
STATEMENT 1-3 (Apr. 9, 1989).
18. For example, the Iowa statute states that its purpose is "to ensure that
contract actions and defenses on credit agreements are supported by clear and
certain written proof of the terms of such agreements to protect against fraud
and to enhance the clear and predictable understanding of rights and duties
under credit agreements." IowA CODE ANN. § 535.17(6) (West Supp. 1991).
The Nebraska statute requires the lender to give the borrower notice of the
statute and inform the borrower that the purpose of the writing requirement
is "[t]o protect you and us from any misunderstandings or disappointments."
NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-1,113(2) (Supp. 1990). The Missouri statute contains a
similar admonition. See Mo. ANN. STAT. 432.045(3) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
Most statutes do not contain a similar explicit statement of purpose. How-
ever, the respective legislative histories make clear that increased certainty in
contractual liability is the general purpose. The Florida House of Representa-
tives Committee on Commerce described the situation this way:
The lender's relationship with a borrower or a prospective borrower
involves working closely with the customer to assist the individual in
determining the needs of the individual and the soundness of the fi-
nancial plans. During the course of discussion, the lender may coun-
sel, suggest, and voice opinions as to the feasibility of the financing
plan or loan request. Because of the danger of misunderstanding, and
the fear of subsequent potential liability, lenders sometimes hesitate
to be open and frank with the borrower. In an effort to avoid misun-
derstandings, to facilitate open communications, and to improve an
additional element of certainty and stability in a transaction for both
the lender and the borrower, several states have enacted statutes reg-
ulating credit agreements....
... []his bill... will benefit both the creditor and debtor by giv-
ing certainty to the terms of a credit transaction.
FLORIDA H.R. COMM. ON COMMERCE, STAFF ANALYSIS & ECONOMIC IMPACT
STATEMENT 1-3 (Apr. 9, 1989). The Arkansas Bank Commissioner indicated a
similar purpose:
The loan files provide the only objective means to determine the ex-
tent of banks' exposure.... [A]ny oral understandings or agreements
are subject to misinterpretation by banks' customers who may unduly
rely on such statements to their detriment. Therefore, we believe it is
in the best interest of all involved to amend our Statue [sic] of Frauds
[Vol. 76:295
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The underlying rationale supporting efforts to reduce
lender liability litigation rests on economics. The argument
may be stated very simply: The highly unpredictable nature of
lender liability law interferes with the lenders' important eco-
nomic role.19 Lenders serve as the cardiovascular system of a
free-market economy. They gather capital from investors and
pump it to areas where it is needed to further economic
growth.20 Without lending, growth would be impossible.
21
Lender liability judgments increase the lenders' costs, forcing
them either to increase the cost of credit or to reduce incen-
to make it clear that such oral statements may not be relied upon and
are not enforceable.
MEMORANDUM TO MEM3ERS OF THE ARKANSAS LEGISLATURE FROM BILL FORD,
STATE BANK COMMISSIONER REGARDING CERTAIN AMENDMENTS TO THE A-
KANSAS STATUTE OF FRAUDS (Feb. 8, 1989).
Other state legislatures indicated the same purpose. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA
SENATE RULES COMM., REPORT OF OFFICE OF SENATE FLOOR ANALYSES 2
(Aug. 29, 1988) ('"The purpose of this bill is to decrease the number of disputes
between lenders and borrowers involving oral commitments to lend money or
extend credit.... Passage of SB 2789 will reduce lawsuits because both parties
will clearly understand the process involved in making a loan commitment.");
HAwAii CONF. CoMM. REP. No. 17, at 2 (Apr. 21, 1990) ("Mhis bill will add
certainty in deciding when the borrower can consider the lender committed.");
MINNESOTA H.R. COMMERCE & ECON. DEVELOPMENT COMM. (Apr. 19, 1985)
(stating that the statute "provides greater certainty in lending transactions for
both the borrower and the lender") (audiotaped statement of Rep. Dempsey);
OREGON LEGISLATURE'S STATEMENT OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT ON SENATE BILL
548 (June 22, 1989) ("It is the intent of SB 548: to prevent unfounded litigation
against lenders based on oral agreements [and] to reduce misunderstandings
about the terms of lending agreements."); see also Robert D. Rowe, Special
Project Note, Written Agreements in the Lender-Borrower Context The Illu-
sion of Certainty, 42 VAND. L. REV. 917, 946 (1989) ("An amendment to the
Statute of Frauds . . . would balance lender-borrower concerns and bring
greater certainty to the lending process.").
19. See Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE
L.J. 131, 133 (1989) (arguing that lender liability is frequently based on a mis-
understanding of basic economic principles); James R. Borders, Note, The
Growth of Lender Liability: An Economic Perspective, 21 GA. L. REV. 723,742-
52 (1987) (arguing that that lender liability hurts the economy).
20. See Borders, supra note 19, at 743.
21. The Treasury Department recently announced a package of regulatory
adjustments-entitled "Easing the Credit Crunch to Promote Economic
Growth"--designed to remove impediments to lending. Kenneth H. Bacon &
Fred R. Bleakley, Bush Moves to Relieve 'Credit Crunch', WALL ST. J., Oct. 9,
1991, at A2. Moreover, in his 1991 State of the Union address, after admitting
that the country was in a recession, President Bush declared that "[s]ound
banks should be making more sound loans. And interest rates should be
lower, now." Alan Murray & Fred R. Bleakley, Plan ofAttack" U.S. Seeks to
Curb Recession by Focusing on 'Credit Crunch', WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1991, at
1991]
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tives for depositors.22 Thus, legislatures have responded to the
lenders' desire23 for a more reliable and objective means to de-
termine the extent of their contractual liability.'
Credit agreement statutes, however, do not provide lenders
with a defense to all claims by borrowers. First, the statutes'
principle aim is to eliminate breach of oral contract claims.25
Thus, the statutes should not affect claims alleging either
breach of a written credit agreement or tortious conduct.26 Sec-
ond, most states have provided protections for unsophisticated
borrowers that will allow them, in some instances, to assert
breach of oral contract claims. These protections, which are
discussed in Part II,27 include exemptions from the writing re-
quirement for non-business loans. These protections point to a
second general policy choice embodied within these statutes,
that of shielding unsophisticated borrowers by refusing to allow
lenders to use the statute as a blanket defense to all claims.28
22. The Arkansas State Bank Commissioner warned that these judgments
may render banks insolvent overnight. MEMORANDUM FROM BILL FORD, AR-
KANSAS STATE BANK COMMISSIONER, TO MEMBERS OF THE ARKANSAS LEGISLA-
TURE (Feb. 8, 1989).
23. State bankers associations have been the general proponents of this
legislation. See, e.g., Colorado Limits Liability, supra note 11, at 481; Califor-
nia Legislature Approves Limits on Liability for Oral Promises, 51 BANKING
REP. (BNA) No. 10, at 435 (Sept. 12, 1988); TESTIMONY OF PHIL GOLDSMITH RE-
GARDING OREGON SENATE BILL 548, at 1 (June 20, 1989) (discussing negotia-
tions over language "the Oregon Bankers Association considered to be
acceptable").
24. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., OREGON LEGISLATURE'S STATEMENT OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT
ON SENATE BILL 548 (June 22, 1989) (stating that the goal is to prevent litiga-
tion "based on. oral agreements"); CALIFORNIA SENATE RULES COMm., REPORT
OF OFFICE OF SENATE FLOOR ANALYSES 2 (Aug. 29, 1988) ("The purpose of this
bill is to decrease the number of disputes between lenders and borrowers in-
volving oral commitments to lend money or extend credit.").
26. See FLORIDA H.R. COMM. ON COMMERCE, STAFF ANALYSIS & ECO-
NOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT 2 (Apr. 9, 1989) ("[I]t should be noted that statutes
such as the one proposed impact only one area of lender liability and will not
eliminate lender liability suits.").
27. See infra notes 40-53 and accompanying text.
28. See OREGON STATEMENT OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT ON SENATE BILL 548
(June 22, 1989) ("It is the intent of SB 548 ... to not eliminate legitimate
claims on oral contracts, where contracts in fact have occured, and undue
hardship may result.").
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II. THE STATES' VARIOUS APPROACHES
A. APPROACHES IN GENERAL
There is no "uniform" credit agreement statute.- The
only basic aspect common to all of the statutes is a requirement
that the writing be at least as detailed as that required for any
other contract within the traditional Statute of Frauds.30 Be-
yond this similarity, little uniformity exists. Nevertheless,
some general observations and comparisons are possible.31
29. A task force of the ABA has produced a "model" statute, the text of
which can be found in John L. Culhane, Jr. & Dean C. Gramlich, Lender Lia-
bility Limitation Amendments to State Statutes of Frauds, 45 Bus. LAW. 1779,
1792 (1990).
30. Several states follow the approach of the 1677 Statute and require
only that the agreement be in writing and signed by the party to be charged.
See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1624(g) (West Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-
10-124(2) (Supp 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 13-5-30(7) (Michie Supp. 1991); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 9-06-04(4) (1987). Other states require more. Some require the
agreement be signed by both parties. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.0304
(West 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, para. 7102 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND.
CODE ANN. § 32-2-1.4-1 (Burns Supp. 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-1,113(1)
(Supp. 1990). Some require that consideration be expressly stated. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 8-9-2(7) (Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.0304 (West 1990);
MINN. STAT. § 513.33 (1990). Some require that the agreement set forth the
terms and conditions. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1122 (West Supp. 1991);
MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-317(b)(3) (1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-
5-4(6) (Supp. 1991).
31. In general, the legislation creating a writing requirement for credit
agreements has taken one of two forms. The first involves amending the
state's existing Statute of Frauds to include credit agreements. Georgia's stat-
ute is the simplest example of this type. It merely adds the phrase "any com-
mitment to lend money" to the existing Statute. GA. CODE ANN. § 13-5-30(7)
(Michie Supp. 1991); see also ALA. CODE ANN. § 8-9-2(7) (Supp. 1991); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-550(a)(6) (West Supp. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 53-8-
2(4) (1990). The second type involves enacting an entirely independent statu-
tory section. Minnesota's statute was the first and is typical. See MINN. STAT.
§ 513.33 (1990); see also infra note 58 (providing the text of the Minnesota stat-
ute). The differences in form may prove significant as courts begin to inter-
pret the statutes. An enactment that does no more than include credit
agreements within a state's Statute of Frauds provision seems to instruct
courts to apply a traditional Statute of Frauds analysis. See infra notes 150-56
and accompanying text. At the opposite extreme, an independent provision
seems to instruct courts to disregard the traditional analysis. See infra notes
136-43 and accompanying text.
Between the extremes lie areas where legislative intent is less definitive.
For example, a state may have attached detailed credit agreement provisions
to an otherwise undetailed traditional Statute of Frauds. See, e.g., UTAH CODE
ANN. § 25-5-4 (Supp. 1991). This type of statute gives a court little guidance as
to the legislature's intent regarding the displacement of traditional Statute of
Frauds rules.
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1. Protections for Lenders
Some statutes apply to more lending transactions than
others. Although this Note discusses these statutes as covering
"credit agreements, ' 32 some statutes are arguably rather nar-
row. For example, some statutes cover only "agreements to
lend."33 Other statutes, however, are much broader. These
statutes explicitly extend coverage to "credit agreements" and
then broadly define a "credit agreement."
In addition, some of the statutes give lenders 5 special ad-
vantages. Although some statutes operate to preclude actions
by both borrowers and lenders,36 others operate to preclude ac-
tions by borrowers only.3 7 In other words, a borrower must
produce written evidence to stay in court, but a lender need
not. This intent to preclude only borrower's actions may be
either explicit or implicit.38
32. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (generally defining the term
"credit agreement").
33. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-550(a)(6) (West Supp. 1991); GA.
CODE ANN. § 13-5-30(7) (Michie Supp. 1991); VA. CODE. ANN. § 11-2(9) (Michie
Supp. 1991).
Commentators explain the limited scope as follows:
A state which perceives the problem as being limited to litigation re-
garding preclosing commitments to lend will, as the Georgia legisla-
ture has done, specifically limit the scope of its statute to
commitments.... Georgia... [and other states] have all chosen not
to have their statutes explicitly applicable to changes or modifications
to the underlying agreement.
Culhane & Gramlich, supra note 29, at 1787. Another example is North Da-
kota's statute. As passed in 1985, this statute covered only original commit-
ments to lend. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-06-04(4) (1987). Apparently recognizing
that courts might find the statute did not apply to modifications, the North
Dakota legislature explicitly extended coverage to modifications in 1991. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 9-06-04(5) (Supp. 1991).
34. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.0304(1)(a) (West 1990); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 6:1121(1) (West Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.36.100 (West
Supp. 1991); see also supra note 8.
35. The types of lenders entitled to protection under the credit agreement
statutes vary in some states. Some statutes cover only "financial institutions."
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-10-124 (Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-117
to -119 (Supp. 1990); OR REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.580(1)(h) (Butterworth Supp.
1990). Others apply to any person engaged in the business of lending. See, e.g.,
CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1624(g) (West Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, para.
7101 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991). Still others apply to any "person who extends
credit." See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.0304(1)(b) (West 1990).
36. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-10-124 (Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 16-117 to -119 (Supp. 1990); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-317
(1989).
37. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, para. 7102 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991);
MINN. STAT. § 513.33 (1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 656-1 (Supp. 1991).
38. A statute covering agreements to lend is of no use to a borrower de-
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To provide additional protection to lenders, several states
forbid the use of alternative theories of recovery, such as
breach of fiduciary or other duty, if the other theories would
require proof of the same facts necessary to prove an oral
agreement.39 These provisions prevent innovative attorneys
from pleading around the statute's limitations.
2. Protections for Borrowers
Several features of the credit agreement statutes provide
protection for borrowers.40 Some states require the lender to
provide special notice4' informing borrowers of the writing re-
quirement in or with the agreement, 42 in separate brochures,43
fending a lender's claim that the parties orally agreed to accelerate repayment.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-550(a)(6) (West Supp. 1991).
39. For example, the Louisiana statute provides that "[a] credit agreement
shall not be implied from the relationship, fiduciary, or otherwise, of the credi-
tor and the debtor." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6:1123(B) (West Supp. 1991). Also,
the model credit agreement statute proposed by the A.B.A. Task Force on
Lender Liability Limitation Amendments to State Statutes of Frauds recom-
mends that states adopt similar language "to foreclose 'end runs'" around the
writing requirement. Culhane & Gramlich, supra note 29, at 1797.
40. The Oregon statute especially protects borrowers' interests. After
stating the general rule that a credit agreement must be in writing, OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 41.580(i)(h) (Butterworth Supp. 1990), the statute dedicates
eleven paragraphs to exceptions which limit the general rule's effect. I&i
§§ 41.580(1)(h)(A)-(C), 41.580(2)-(3); see also FLORIDA H.R. COMM. ON COM-
MERCE, STAFF ANALYsIs & ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT 3 (Apr. 4, 1989)
('While the bill would restrict the ability of the borrower to bring a suit upon
oral credit agreements, this bill... will provide several benefits to borrowers
as well.").
41. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.17(2) (West Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 16-118(b) (Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 432.045(3) (Vernon Supp.
1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-1,113(2)(c) (Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-6-
5(B) (Michie 1991); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.580(1)(h) (Butterworth Supp.
1990); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 26.02(e)-(g) (West Supp. 1991); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 25-5-4(6)(d) (Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.36.130 to
.140 (West Supp. 1991); see also Culhane & Gramlich, supra note 29, at 1789
("As a means of protecting unsophisticated borrowers, a state legislature may
also wish to consider whether to require the lender to include in or with the
agreement a special notice informing borrowers of the effect of the signed
writing requirement.").
42. Oregon requires notice to be included in the loan document and to be
underlined or in at least 10-point bold type to the effect that "[u]nder Oregon
law, most agreements, promises and commitments made by us ... concerning
loans and other credit extensions... must be in writing, express consideration
and be signed by us to be enforceable." OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.580(3)(a)
(Butterworth Supp. 1990); see also IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.17 (West Supp.
1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16-118(b) (Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 432.045(3)
(Vernon Supp. 1991).
43. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41.580(3)(c) (Butterworth Supp. 1990).
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or in a conspicuous public posting within the lending institu-
tion.44 These provisions protect the borrower by requiring the
lender to share information about the statute.4 5
Additionally, most statutes exempt some types of transac-
tions. For example, many states provide a dollar threshold,
ranging from $10,00046 to $250,000,47 below which a borrower
may still allege an oral agreement. The majority of states also
exempt transactions for personal, family, or household pur-
poses.48 These limitations tend to protect unsophisticated
borrowers.4 9
Finally, although some statutes explicitly displace the com-
mon law,50 most statutes, either explicitly5 ' or implicitly,52 re-
44. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 26.02(e), (f), (g) (West Supp.
1991).
45. The Iowa statute's recommended notice attempts to alert unwary bor-
rowers. It reads:
IMPORTANT: READ BEFORE SIGNING. THE TERMS OF THIS
AGREEMENT SHOULD BE READ CAREFULLY BECAUSE
ONLY THOSE TERMS IN WRITING ARE ENFORCEABLE. NO
OTHER TERMS OR ORAL PROMISES NOT CONTAINED IN
THIS WRITTEN CONTRACT MAY BE LEGALLY ENFORCED.
YOU MAY CHANGE THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT ONLY
BY ANOTHER WRITTEN AGREEMENT.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.17(3) (West Supp. 1991). The Nebraska statute requires
a similar warning. NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-1,113(2) (Supp. 1990).
46. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-101(d) (Michie Supp. 1991).
47. E.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-101(9) (Supp. 1991).
48. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.010(a)(13) (Supp. 1991); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 2714(b) (Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-6-5 (Michie 1991).
Moreover, several states exempt certain transactions to avoid interference
with common consumer and commercial practices and to avoid conflicts with
the existing Statute of Frauds. The most common exclusions are credit cards,
see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ANN. ch. 17, para. 7101(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991);
TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.02(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1991), and real es-
tate mortgages, see, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.580(1)(h)(B)-(C) (But-
terworth Supp. 1990). Kansas has the most exhaustive list of exclusions,
specifically excluding promissory notes, real estate mortgages, security agree-
ments, guaranty agreements, letters of credit, student loans, and credit cards.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16-117(a) (Supp. 1990).
49. The distinction between sophisticated and unsophisticated borrowers
is supported by the argument that a credit agreement statute's goal:
should be to protect the lender against claims raised by sophisticated
borrowers who were or could have been represented by counsel and
who could have had any agreements reduced to written form. At the
same time, the state legislature must also be sensitive to the interests
of less sophisticated borrowers who were not or could not have been
represented by counsel and who may not, because of their lack of bar-
gaining power, have been in a position to insist upon having their full
agreements reduced to written form.
Culhane & Gramlich, supra note 29, at 1786.
50. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.17(7) (West Supp. 1991) (displacing
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cognize at least some common law protections for the borrower.
Of particular importance is the continued viability of the pro-
missory estoppel doctrine, 53 which prevents lenders from using
the writing requirement as a blanket defense in cases where
doing so would produce inequitable results.
B. MINNESOTA'S CREDIT AGREEMENT STATUTE
Although sweeping generalizations are impossible given
the diversity among state statutes, the Minnesota statute pro-
vides some useful lessons and insights. Minnesota's credit
agreement statute, passed in 1985,54 was one of the first in the
country. Several states have patterned their credit agreement
statutes after the Minnesota statute,55 and some have adopted
almost identical languages 6 Moreover, almost all of the case
law to date has been decided under the Minnesota statuteY.'
"principles of common law and equity"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-10-124(3)
(Supp. 1991) (specifically disallowing promissory estoppel claims).
51. See, ag., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.580(2)(a) (Butterworth Supp. 1990)
(providing that "all defenses and exceptions to [the Statute of Frauds] recog-
nized by the courts of this state shall also apply to the credit agreement
statute]").
52. A provision adding credit agreements to the traditional Statute of
Frauds, see, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. § 656-1(8) (Supp. 1991), seems to indicate the
continued validity of traditional defenses and exceptions. See HAWAIi CONF.
CoMM. REP. No. 17, at 2 (Apr. 21, 1990) ('"raditional common law remedies
will continue to apply.").
53. Several courts have adopted promissory estoppel as a defense to the
Statute of Frauds. See, ag., McIntosh v. Murphy, 469 P.2d 177, 181 (Haw.
1970); Decatur Coop. Ass'n v. Urban, 547 P.2d 323, 329 (Kan. 1976); Texarkana
Constr. Co. v. Alpine Constr. Specialties, Inc., 489 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1972). Contra Kahn v. Cecelia Co., 40 F. Supp. 878, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1941);
Keller v. Penovich, 262 So. 2d 243, 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). The Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts contains promissory estoppel as an exception. Sec-
tion 139 provides:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce ac-
tion or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and
which does induce the action or forbearance is enforceable notwith-
standing the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided only by en-
forcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach is to be
limited as justice requires.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (1979).
54. 1985 Minn. Laws 784.
55. See, e.g., FLORIDA H.R. COMM. ON COMMERCE, STAFF ANALYSIS & ECo-
NOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT 4 (Apr. 9, 1989) ("The language of HB 878 has been
patterned after the Minnesota credit agreement statute.").
56. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.0304 (West 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 1121-23 (West Supp. 1991).
57. There have been very few cases outside of Minnesota. See Commer-
cial Bank of Korea, Ltd. v. Charone, Inc., No. 90-C-260, 1990 WL 115790 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 3, 1990) (holding that the Illinois credit agreement statute will not be
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The Minnesota statute operates in a straightforward man-
ner.58 It provides that a borrower "may not maintain an action
on a credit agreement"5 9 unless that credit agreement is in
writing, includes the "relevant terms and conditions, '60 and is
signed by both parties.6' The statute broadly defines a "credit
agreement"6 2 and also identifies specific actions, such as a
course of dealing, that will not lead to an enforceable modifica-
tion of a credit agreement.63 The legislative history makes
clear that the purpose of the Minnesota statute is to increase
certainty regarding the binding effect as well as the terms of a
applied retroactively); Video Cassette Games, Inc. v. Sanwa Business Credit
Corp., No. 89-C-4730, 1990 WL 106567 (N.D. Ill. July 12, 1990) (same); Pima
Fin. Serv. Corp. v. Selby, No. 90-CA0722, 1991 WL 64156 (Colo. Ct. App. Apr.
25, 1991) (holding that a settlement agreement is within the Colorado statute's
definition of a credit agreement); Cameron v. Bank of East Tennessee, No. 149,
1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 846 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1990) (requiring, even
before the credit agreement statute, that a real estate loan commitment must
be in writing under the Statute of Frauds), appeal denied, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS
103 (Tenn. 1991).
58. The Minnesota statute reads:
513.33 CREDIT AGREEMENTS
Subdivision 1. Definitions. For the purpose of this section, the follow-
ing terms have the meanings given them:
(1) "credit agreement" means an agreement to lend or forbear re-
payment of money, goods, or things in action, to otherwise extend
credit, or to make any other financial accommodation;
(2) "creditor" means a person who extends credit under a credit
agreement with a debtor; and
(3) "debtor" means a person who obtains credit or seeks a credit
agreement with a creditor or who owes money to a creditor.
Subd. 2. Credit agreements to be in writing. A debtor may not main-
tain an action on a credit agreement unless the agreement is in writ-
ing, expresses consideration, sets forth the relevant terms and
conditions, and is signed by the creditor and the debtor.
Subd. 3. Actions not considered agreements. (a) The following ac-
tions do not give rise to a claim that a new credit agreement is cre-
ated, unless the agreement satisfies the requirements of subdivision 2:
(1) the rendering of financial advice by a creditor to a debtor;
(2) the consultation by a creditor with a debtor; or
(3) the agreement by a creditor to take certain actions, such as
entering into a new credit agreement, forbearing from exercising rem-
edies under prior credit agreements, or extending installments due
under prior credit agreements.
(b) A credit agreement may not be implied from the relationship,
fiduciary, or otherwise, of the creditor and the debtor.
MINN. STAT. § 513.33 (1990).
59. Id. § 513.33-2.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See id. § 513.33-1(1).
63. See id. § 513.33-3.
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loan commitment.6 Unfortunately, Minnesota courts have
struggled to interpret the statute consistently.
C. MINNESOTA CASE LAW
Although the case law under the Minnesota credit agree-
ment statute is limited, cases interpreting the statutes of other
states are virtually non-existent.s Thus, a look at the Minne-
sota case law is necessary when attempting to assess the impact
of credit agreement statutes. The Minnesota cases have raised
issues about what must be in writing,6 the role of the parol evi-
dence rule,6 7 and the statute's effect on fraud claims. 68
64. The purpose of the Minnesota credit agreement statute is to:
improve communication and avoid the misunderstanding and the po-
tential litigation that can occur if [the credit agreement statute] is not
in place. It provides greater certainty in lending transactions for both
the borrower and the lender so when a person is in a position of need-
ing a loan he will know that he has a firm and forceful contractual
commitment from the lender when the loan commitment has been re-
duced to writing. Right now that is open to litigation and question be-
cause not only is there a question of whether the commitment is
made, but also the terms and conditions of the commitment itself, so
this removes all those uncertainties and should benefit both lender
and borrower.
MINNESOTA HOUSE COMMERCE & ECON. DEVELOPMENT COMM. (Apr. 19, 1985)
(audiotaped statement of Rep. Dempsey). There is no record of any opposition
to the bill, either by legislators or outside witnesses. See id; MINNESOTA SEN-
ATE ECON. DEVELOPMENT & COMMERCE COMM. (Apr. 2,1985) (audiotape). The
bill passed both the House and Senate unanimously. MINNESOTA HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES (May 20, 1985) (audiotape) (93-0); MINNESOTA SENATE
COMM. OF THE WHOLE (May 6, 1985) (audiotape) (61-0).
The legislature also indicated a concern that a lender's extension of a line
of credit might lead a borrower to expect continued credit. See MINNESOTA
SENATE ECON. DEVELOPMENT & COMMERCE COMM. (Apr. 2, 1985) (audiotaped
comments of Sen. Peterson). At least one legislator indicated the expectation
that a borrower's awareness that a credit agreement must be in writing would
benefit the borrower:
most often in the case of where the borrower would be denied credit
at some future date and then would have this writing to proceed
against the lender. This would give certainty to those transactions
and would also allow the borrowers to know in each case that they do
in fact have a loan commitment, the terms of that commitment, and
the amount of the loan.
MINNESOTA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATiVES (May 20, 1985) (audiotaped comments
of Rep. Dempsey).
65. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 81-114 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 115-30 and accompanying text. Additionally, a Minne-
sota court held that retroactive application of the statute is constitutional.
Drewes v. First Nat'l Bank of Detroit Lakes, 461 N.W.2d 389, 391 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1990) (holding that the application of the statute to bar a claim on an al-
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1. What Must Be in Writing
Litigation under the Minnesota statute has focused on de-
termining what constitutes a "credit agreement" and what ele-
ments of a "credit agreement" must be in writing. Generally,
borrowers have alleged either that the parties orally modified a
prior written agreement or that a lender made an oral promise
before or contemporaneously with the execution of a written
agreement.
a. Modifications
Minnesota courts have dismissed borrowers' claims that al-
leged a lender's oral promise or conduct, in effect, modified a
written credit agreement. In one case, Becker v. First Ameri-
can State Bank of Redwood Falls,69 the borrowers alleged that a
bank with which they had done business for more than ten
years orally agreed to continue financing the borrowers' busi-
ness if they reduced their indebtedness.70 The borrowers
claimed that they reduced their indebtedness, 71 but, two years
later, the lender refused the borrowers' request for an addi-
tional loan.72 The borrowers sued for damages under the oral
agreement.73 The court, however, held that the alleged agree-
ment was a "credit agreement" that needed to be in writing.74
Thus, the court determined that the credit agreement statute
required a ruling for the lender as a matter of law.75
In another case, Fronning v. Blume,76 the written credit
agreement made clear that the lender retained complete discre-
tion over additional advances. 77 Nevertheless, the borrower al-
leged that his course of dealing with the lender entitled him to
leged oral contract did not amount to an impairment of contract in violation of
the federal and Minnesota constitutions).
69. 420 N.W.2d 239 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
70. Id at 239.
71. Specifically, the borrowers claimed that in reliance on the oral agree-
ment, they sold several parcels of real estate for less than market value and
used the proceeds to reduce their indebtedness to the lender. Id
72. Id, at 240.
73. Id
74. Id
75. Id. at 241.
76. 429 N.W.2d 310 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
77. Id at 311. The relevant clause read: "However, each individual loan or
advance will always be at the sole discretion of our officers, based on whatever
information the bank then has with respect to your financial condition. Noth-
ing herein should be interpreted as being a promise to make any one or more
loans." Id.
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further credit or a warning that no additional credit would be
forthcoming.78 In dismissing the borrower's claim, the court
noted that the statute clearly provides that no credit agreement
will be "implied from the relationship. 79
In short, the Minnesota courts have consistently relied on
the credit agreement statute to dismiss borrowers' claims that a
lender's oral promise or conduct altered a prior written credit
agreement.80
b. Contemporaneous Oral Promises or Conditions and the
Parol Evidence Rule
In several cases, borrowers have claimed that a lender
made an oral promise at the time the parties executed a written
credit agreement. Inconsistent methods of analysis by the
courts, particularly when addressing the parol evidence rule,8'
78. Id. at 314.
79. Id.; see also Rural Am. Bank of Greenwald v. Herickhoff, 473 N.W.2d
361, 363 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that the Legislature's primary goal
was "to prevent borrowers from using an ongoing lending relationship with a
lender to enforce unwritten agreements for future loans").
80. One non-Minnesota case has also addressed the issue of whether an al-
leged agreement was a "credit agreement" and thus within the terms of a
credit agreement statute. Pima Fin. Serv. Corp. v. Selby, No. 90-CA0722, 1991
WL 64156 (Colo. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 1991). This case involved a purported settle-
ment agreement. Pima Financial had foreclosed on property securing repay-
ment of a promissory note and brought an action to recover a deficiency
judgment. Id. at *1. During the litigation, the parties entered into settlement
negotiations. Id. When the borrower-defendant tendered to Pima Financial a
written settlement agreement, Pima did not sign it. Id. The borrower later
brought a "motion to enforce settlement agreement." Id, The trial court con-
cluded that the purported settlement agreement constituted a "credit agree-
ment" within the meaning of the Colorado statute. Id The Court of Appeals
affirmed. Id. at *3. The court noted that under the Colorado statute, a "credit
agreement" includes any "amendment of, cancellation or waiver of, or substi-
tution for any and all terms or provisions" of any credit agreement. Id. The
court held that the alleged settlement agreement would have canceled or
waived the original credit agreement, and therefore was itself a "credit agree-
ment." Id at *4. Thus, the Colorado credit agreement statute prohibited en-
forcement of the alleged settlement. Id.
81. The parol evidence rule provides that evidence of prior or contempo-
raneous agreements or negotiations is not admissible to contradict a term of an
integrated writing. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 215 (1979); see
also JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 3-2,
at 135-36 (3d ed. 1987). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states: "An in-
tegrated agreement is a writing or writings constituting a final expression of
one or more terms of an agreement." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 209(1) (1979). Moreover, an additional oral term which does not contradict a
written agreement is inadmissible if the written agreement is a completely in-
tegrated writing. Id, § 216. To be completely integrated, a writing must be "a
complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement." Id. § 210(1).
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has led to disparate results in these cases.
In Pako Corp. v. Citytrust,s2 a borrower alleged that an
oral promise made in connection with a written loan agreement
permitted the borrower to compel the lender to assign the loan
to a third party lender chosen by the borrower.8 3 The court
held that the "broad language" of the credit agreement statute
extended to the alleged oral condition.8 4 Without mentioning
the parol evidence rule, the court found that the statute's writ-
ing requirement prevents enforcement of an oral condition of
an underlying written agreement.8 5
In other cases, however, Minnesota courts have been more
sympathetic to borrowers' claims that a lender made an oral
promise in connection with a written credit agreement. For ex-
ample, in Rural American Bank of Greenwald v. Herickhoff,86
the defendant borrowed money to finance his son's farming op-
eration after his son had exhausted his own credit limit.87 The
defendant alleged that bank officials told him that the farming
operation's proceeds would be used to pay off the defendant's
loan first.88 In fact, the bank applied the proceeds to pay off
the son's loan, after which the bank sued the defendant on the
note.8 9 The court questioned whether the oral agreement to ap-
ply farm proceeds to one loan before another was a separate
credit agreement within the meaning of the statute.90 The
court held that the oral agreement was not a separate credit
agreement and thus, without further explanation,91 concluded
that the credit agreement statute had no application to these
facts.9 2 Because neither party raised a parol evidence issue, the
82. 109 B.R. 368 (D. Mim. 1989).
83. Id. at 370.
84. Id. at 377.
85. Id
86. 473 N.W.2d 361 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
87. Id. at 361.
88. Id. at 361-62.
89. Id at 362.
90. Id.
91. The court's opinion does not address whether this alleged oral condi-
tion of the written agreement needed to be in writing. See id at 363.
92. Id. In support of its conclusion, the court stated that the legislative
purpose behind the statute was to prevent borrowers from using an ongoing
lending relationship to enforce unwritten agreements for future loans, not to
address the obligations of parties under a written loan agreement. Id The
court also noted the statute prevents a debtor from "'maintain[ing ] an ac-
tion,' " but not necessarily from asserting an oral agreement as a defense to an
action by a lender. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 513.33-2 (1990)). In comparison,
some credit agreement statutes explictly provide that a "credit agreement is
not enforceable by way of action or defense." MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
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court declined to address it. 93
Other courts have framed the issue similarly. In two cases,
borrowers executed mortgages and later alleged that the lend-
ers orally promised not to record those mortgages.94 In both
cases the courts found that the alleged promise to refrain from
recording the mortgage was not a separate credit agreement
and, therefore, did not necessarily need to be in writing.
In one case, Carlson v. Estes,95 the parties executed a mort-
gage, a promissory note, and a mortgage collateral agreement.96
At the time the parties executed these documents, the lender
allegedly assured the borrower that the mortgage would be re-
corded only if the lender later paid off a second mortgage for
the borrower.97 The borrower paid the second mortgage him-
self, but the lender recorded the first mortgage nevertheless.98
The court concluded that the three documents taken together
constituted a credit agreement.9 Moreover, the court found
that the alleged oral promise not to record the mortgage was
not a separate credit agreement automatically precluded by the
statute.100 The court then addressed the parol evidence rule.
The court noted that parol evidence is admissible when the
written agreement is ambiguous. 01 The court remanded the
case for a determination whether the documents were ambigu-
ous as to the parties' intent to record the mortgage. 0 2 If no
ambiguity existed, the court directed that the parol evidence
rule bars evidence of the alleged oral promise.10 3 If the docu-
ments were ambiguous, evidence of the alleged oral promise
would be admissible.10 4
ANN. § 5-317(b) (1989) (emphasis added); see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, para.
7102 (Smith Hurd Supp. 1991) ("A debtor may not maintain an action on or in
any way related to a credit agreement."); NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-1,113(1) ("A
debtor or a creditor may not maintain an action or assert a defense in an ac-
tion based on a credit agreement.").
93. 473 N.W.2d at 363 n.2.
94. Carlson v. Estes, 458 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); Ingvalson v.
Habberstad, No. C6-89-46, 1989 Minn. App. LEXIS 854 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 1,
1989).
95. 458 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
96. Id- at 127.
97. Id at 125.
98. Id
99. Id at 127.
100. Id-
101. Id
102. Id
103. Id
104. Id
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In the other case, Ingvalson v. Habberstad,10 5 the borrow-
ers executed a mortgage on their farm to secure a line of
credit.'0 6 The borrowers claimed that the bank later told them
that it expected a bank examination by regulators and "as a
favor the bank wanted additional mortgages" which would be
temporary and unrecorded. 0 7 The borrowers executed the ad-
ditional mortgages, but when they requested that the bank re-
turn the mortgages, it refused' 0 8 In an attempt to prevent
foreclosure, the borrowers sought to prove the alleged oral
promise to return the mortgages. 0 9 The trial court granted
summary judgment for the lender, holding that the parol evi-
dence rule and the credit agreement statute barred evidence of
the oral agreement." 0 The court of appeals reversed both con-
clusions. 111 The court held that the alleged promise to return
the mortgages was not a separate credit agreement and thus a
writing was not required.112 The court also stated that the pa-
rol evidence rule did not exclude evidence of fraudulent oral
representations to induce another to enter into a written agree-
ment.11 The court did not explain the parol evidence rule's
relationship to the credit agreement statute." 4
Thus, in most cases where a borrower has alleged an oral
promise made prior to or contemporaneously with the execu-
tion of a written agreement, the courts have allowed evidence
of that promise. The parol evidence rule has generally not
barred the evidence.
2. Fraud Claims
Although the litigation has focused on what agreements
and terms must be in writing, the Minnesota courts have also
addressed the credit agreement statute's effect on allegations of
fraud. Fraud may serve both as a defense to a suit on a con-
105. No. C6-89-46, 1989 Minn. App. LEXIS 854 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 1,
1989).
106. Id at *1.
107. I& at *3. The apparent purpose of the additional mortgages would be
to deceive regulators about the extent to which the bank's loans were secured.
See id.
108. Id,
109. Id at *4.
110. Id
111. Id at *6, *9.
112. Id at *9. Unlike in Carlson, however, the court did not analyze
whether the parol evidence rule barred evidence of the alleged oral promise.
113. Id- at *5-6.
114. See id-
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tract and as an independent tort.115 Most often borrowers have
alleged fraudulent inducement, contending that they would
never have entered into an agreement had it not been for a
lender's intentional misrepresentations.11 6  Here, too, the
courts' approaches seem inconsistent.
The courts have allowed fraudulent inducement claims in
two cases. In Ingvalson v. Habberstad,117 the borrowers alleged
that the bank's representation that their mortgages would be
used only to satisfy regulators, and then would be returned, in-
duced the borrowers to execute the mortgages and constituted
fraud.11 8 As noted earlier,1 9 the court allowed evidence show-
ing that the bank fraudulently induced the borrowers to exe-
cute the mortgages. 120 The court concluded that neither the
parol evidence rule nor the credit agreement statute barred
such a claim.' 2 '
In Fronning v. Blume,2 2 also mentioned above, the bor-
rower alleged that he refused to sign a mortgage until the
lender convinced him it was merely a description of his farm
and that the document would stay in the loan officer's desk. 2 3
The court allowed a claim that the lender fraudulently ob-
tained the mortgage.124 Here, too, the court held that neither
the parol evidence rule nor the credit agreement statute barred
115. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 81, § 9-13, at 356.
116. Not all borrowers who allege fraud, however, argue that they would
never have entered into the agreement absent fraud. For example, when the
lender in Capital Bank v. Sorenson, No. C4-90-1122, 1990 Minn. App. LEXIS
1267 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 1990), sued on certain promissory notes as they
became due, the borrower counterclaimed for fraudulent misrepresentation,
alleging an oral agreement to roll over the notes. Id. at *4. The court held
that the counterclaims failed as a matter of law because of the credit agree-
ment statute. Id The court stated that under the parol evidence rule, evi-
dence of fraudulent misrepresentation is admissible only to show that no
enforceable contract was made, not to vary the terms of the admitted contract.
I& at *4-5. ("[R]eliance on an oral representation is unjustifiable as a matter
of law if the written contract provision explicitly contradicts the
misrepresention.").
117. No. C6-89-46, 1989 LEXIS 854 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 1989).
118. Id- at *3-4.
119. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
120. Ingvalson, 1989 Minn. App. LEXIS 854, at *5-6. The court held that
the parol evidence rule did not bar such evidence. Id.
121. Id. at *9.
122. 429 N.W.2d 310 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
123. Id at 312.
124. Id- at 313. The court held that the parol evidence rule did not bar evi-
dence of fraudulent inducement. Id The court distinguished between evi-
dence of oral terms offered to show that no contract was ever made and
evidence to contradict, vary, or add to terms of the written contract. Id
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the claim.' 25
In another case, however, decided after Ingvalson and
Fronning, a court summarily dismissed a borrower's fraudulent
inducement claim. In Norwest Bank Montevideo v. General
Dryer Corp.,1 26 the borrower alleged that Norwest orally agreed
to continue extending credit if the borrower received a disaster
loan and applied the proceeds to reduce his indebtedness to the
bank. 27 The borrower received the disaster loan and turned
over the proceeds, but Norwest denied additional credit.12s The
borrower claimed fraudulent inducement. 29 The court held
that because the alleged fraud arose from the credit agreement,
the statute precluded the borrower from maintaining the
action.130
In sum, borrowers' claims of fraudulent inducement have
had a mixed reception by the courts. The court in General
Dryer held that the credit agreement statute precluded a fraud-
ulent inducement claim, while in Ingvalson and Fronning the
courts allowed fraudulent inducement claims to proceed.
IV. THE FUTURE FOR WRITTEN CREDIT AGREEMENT
STATUTES
A. LESSONS FROM THE MINNESOTA CASE LAW
The Minnesota case law provides several lessons for other
courts interpreting credit agreement statutes. First, the case
law offers insight on how courts should analyze what must be
in writing.' 3 ' This issue involves not only which agreements
must be in writing, but which elements of the agreement must
be in writing. Second, and relatedly, the case law highlights the
need for a consistent approach when analyzing parol evi-
dence. 32 Finally, the case law indicates that courts will be
forced to consider the impact of credit agreement statutes on
fraud claims.' 33
125. Id
126. No. C4-89-1986, 1990 Minn. App. LEXIS 378 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 24,
1990).
127. Id. at *1-2.
128. Id at *2.
129. Id
130. Id at *4-5.
131. See infra notes 134-43 and accompanying text.
132. See infra notes 144-56 and accompanying text.
133. See infra notes 157-70 and accompanying text.
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1. What Must Be in Writing
In making this determination, courts should first analyze
whether the credit agreement statute covers the disputed oral
promise. The statute may apply either because the alleged oral
promise is itself a credit agreement, or because it is a term of a
written credit agreement which the statute requires to be in
writing. Unfortunately, the Minnesota courts have not been
precise when addressing the issue of what must be in writing.
Although it is clear that no modification of a written agree-
ment is enforceable unless the modification is itself in writ-
ing,'3 borrowers' allegations that the complete original credit
agreement was not in writing has confused the Minnesota
courts. In these types of cases borrowers are alleging, in es-
sence, an oral promise made prior to or contemporaneously
with the written agreement. Courts have frequently framed
the issue as whether the alleged oral promise made prior to or
contemporaneously with a written agreement constitutes a sep-
arate credit agreement. 35 Such an approach is misguided. The
plain language of the Minnesota statute indicates that the
courts should analyze whether the alleged oral promise is a
term of the parties' credit agreement rather than a separate
credit agreement. The Minnesota statute requires that the "rel-
134. The statute clearly precludes claims where a borrower alleges an oral
or conduct-based modification to an existing contract. For example, in Becker
v. First Am. State Bank of Redwood Falls, 420 N.W.2d 239 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988), the borrowers' claim that the lender orally agreed to loan them addi-
tional funds in the future clearly amounted to an alleged oral modification of a
written credit agreement and the statute precluded enforcement. Id- at 240.
Similarly, in Fronning v. Blume, 429 N.W.2d 310 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), the
court correctly concluded that a course of dealing could not create an enforce-
able modification of a written credit agreement. I& at 314; see also Pima Fin.
Serv. Corp. v. Selby, No. 90-CA0722, 1991 WL 64156 (Colo. Ct. App. Apr. 25,
1991) (finding that an alleged settlement agreement that would have canceled
the original credit agreement was itself a credit agreement and needed to be in
writing to be enforceable).
135. For example, in Rural Am. Bank of Greenwald v. Herickhoff, 473
N.W.2d 361 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), the court decided that the statute did not
prevent evidence of an oral promise to apply the farm proceeds to one loan
before the other because this promise would not create a separate credit agree-
ment. Id at 362-63. Similarly, in both Carlson v. Estes, 458 N.W.2d 123 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1990), and Ingvalson v. Habberstad, No. C6-89-46, 1989 Minn. App.
LEXIS 854 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 1989), the courts found that alleged oral
promises made in connection with the execution of mortgages were not sepa-
rate credit agreements and thus the statute did not preclude evidence of these
promises. For a discussion of Carlson and Ingvalson, see supra notes 95-114
and accompanying text.
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evant terms and conditions" be in writing.136 This differs from
the traditional Statute of Frauds requirement that only the "es-
sential terms" must be in writing.137 "Essential" indicates
something that is fundamental or indispensable. 138 Thus, a
writing that contains all "essential terms" need not even be a
final expression of the parties' agreement.139 By contrast, a re-
quirement that the "relevant terms and conditions" be in writ-
ing implies a more stringent requirement.140 By permitting
only "irrelevant" terms to be omitted from the writing, the
Legislature has directed that courts view each written credit
agreement as the complete agreement. Thus, the logical con-
clusion is that a writing which contains all "relevant terms"
must be the final and total expression of the parties'
agreement. 141
136. MINN. STAT. § 513.33-2 (1990).
137. See Culhane & Gramlich, supra note 29, at 1789 ("Minnesota [has]
abandoned the approach of the 1677 Statute.").
A writing satisfies the traditional Statute of Frauds if it reasonably identi-
fies the subject of the contract, indicates that a contract has been made be-
tween the parties, states with reasonable certainty the essential terms of the
contract, and is signed by or on behalf of the party to be charged. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 131 (1979). There is no standard formula for
determining the "essential terms" that must be listed in the writing. See, e.g.,
Brechman v. Adamar of N.J., Inc., 440 A.2d 480, 482 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1981) (stating the general rule in New Jersey that the writing must contain
the essential terms expressed with such certainty that they may be ascertained
from the writing itself).
138. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 465 (2d College ed. 1982).
139. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 81, § 19-27, at 817.
140. "Relevant" means any term "[r]elated to the matter at hand; perti-
nent." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1044 (2d College ed. 1982).
A critic of the Oregon statute recognized the effect of this type of lan-
guage when the Oregon legislature was considering a requirement that the
written agreement set "forth the terms and any conditions of the promise or
commitment." TESTIMONY OF PHIL GOLDSMITH REGARDING SENATE BILL 548,
at 4 (June 1, 1989). He argued that such language "would not simply require
written confirmation that an agreement had been made, but also would limit
the terms enforceable against the lender to those contained in the writing."
Id& This language "would mandate that every conceivable promise a lender
could make during the course of a loan be in writing," id at 5, and "would bar
introduction of ... evidence to supplement the written agreement," i&i at 10.
Significantly, the Oregon legislature amended the proposed language and the
Oregon credit agreement statute now only requires some evidence that a con-
tract was formed. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.580(1)(h) (Butterworth Supp.
1990).
141. The Missouri legislature made this clear. The Missouri statute re-
quires "the relevant terms and conditions" be in writing. Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 432.045(2) (Vernon Supp. 1991). The statute then requires the lender to pro-
vide notice to the borrower that the writing "is the complete and exlusive
statement of the agreement between us." Id. § 432.045(3).
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The central purpose behind the credit agreement statutes
also supports a strict requirement that the complete agreement
be in writing. Although a minimal writing is some evidence
that the parties made an agreement, and therefore prevents
fraud, that concern was not the primary motivating factor be-
hind these statutes. Rather, the goal is to allow a complete and
objective understanding of the agreement. 142 To allow borrow-
ers to assert, as they did in Herickoff, Carlson, and Ingvalson,
that an alleged oral aspect of the agreement does not by itself
fit within the definition of a credit agreement, and therefore
does not need to be in writing, defeats this purpose.143
2. The Parol Evidence Rule
Given that the Minnesota statute's requirement that all
"relevant terms" be in writing directs that the written credit
agreement be the complete agreement,144 the parol evidence
rule should prevent attempts to introduce evidence of addi-
tional or-al terms, even if those terms do not necessarily contra-
dict the written agreement. 45 Unfortunately, Minnesota courts
have failed to recognize the statute's requirement that all "rele-
vant terms" be in writing.14
The appropriate analytical approach for statutes similar to
Minnesota's is first to determine whether the dispute involves a
credit agreement at all. If the dispute involves a credit agree-
ment, the court must determine whether the alleged additional
oral term is "relevant." The logical definition of a "relevant
term" is one which would naturally be included in the writ-
142. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
143. Pako Corp. v Citytrust, 109 B.R. 368 (D. Minn. 1989), is the only case
decided under the Minnesota statute that adopts this approach, at least implic-
itly. In Pako Corp., the court decided that an alleged oral promise to allow the
borrower unilaterally to assign the loan was an oral term of a written agree-
ment and the statute required it to be in writing. Id. at 377.
144. See supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
145. CALAMARi & PERIL=, supra note 81, § 3-4, at 145.
146. For example, in Rural Am. Bank of Greenwald v. Herickoff, 473
N.W.2d 361 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), the court did not address whether the al-
leged promise to apply farm proceeds to one loan before the other was a "rele-
vant term" even though the borrower in that case indicated he would not have
signed the loan agreement without that assurance. Id at 362-63. Similarly, in
both Carlson v. Estes, 458 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990), and Ingvalson v.
Habberstad, No. C6-89-46, 1989 Minn. App. LEXIS 854 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 1,
1989), the courts ruled that the alleged oral promises to refrain from recording
the mortgages were not separate credit agreements but rather were possible
terms of the written agreement. Carlson, 458 N.W.2d at 127; Ingvalson, 1989
Minn. App. LEXIS 854, at *9.
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ing.147 If the alleged oral term is one which the parties would
naturally include in the written agreement, the parol evidence
rule should effectively bar evidence of that term.14 Unfortu-
nately, Minnesota courts have thus far not utilized this
approach.149
Many credit agreement statutes do not require that all
"relevant terms" be in writing. Thus, a similar parol evidence
analysis will not be required under all credit agreement stat-
utes. Some states have merely added the writing requirement
to their existing Statute of Frauds. 5 0 In those states only the
"essential" terms must be in writing, and thus a court cannot
presume the written agreement is a complete integration.' 5 '
Although requiring only a minimal writing before a party can
then allege additional oral terms contradicts the central pur-
pose of these statutes,152 in these states courts may have no al-
ternative but to allow such claims.
Other states have dealt with the parol evidence rule di-
rectly. Under several statutes a credit agreement is conclu-
sively presumed to be a complete integration and evidence of
oral terms is inadmissable.153 Thus, these statutes explicitly
147. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 216(2)(b) (1979).
148. See supra note 81.
149. For example, in Carlson, after recognizing that a oral promise not to
record a mortgage would be "an integral part of the entire credit agreement,"
Carlson, 458 N.W.2d at 127, the court avoided analyzing whether such a term
was "relevant." The court then held that parol evidence would be admissible
if the written credit agreement was not the complete agreement. Id-
In Pako Corp. v. Citytrust, 109 B.R. 368 (D. Minn. 1989), however, the
court reached the logical result, although it failed to discuss explicitly whether
the disputed term was a "relevant term." Addressing the borrower's allega-
tion that an oral condition of the written loan agreement permitted the bor-
rower to assign the loan unilaterally, the court ruled that the statute
precluded the claim. Id at 377-78. The court presumably found, but did not
explicitly state, that such a term was "revelant."
150. See supra note 31 (discussing generally the forms of credit agreement
statutes).
151. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing the general pur-
pose of credit agreement statutes to increase certainty in contractual liability).
153. For example, the Texas statute provides that:
The rights and obligations of the parties . .. shall be determined
solely from the written loan agreement, and any prior oral agree-
ments between the parties are superseded by and merged into the
loan agreement.... An agreement... may not be varied by any oral
agreements or discussions that occur before or contemporaneously
with the execution of the agreement.
TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 26.02(c)-(d) (West Supp. 1991); see also
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.36.110 (West Supp. 1991) ("The rights and obliga-
tions of the parties to a credit agreement shall be determined solely from the
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dictate that courts should conduct the same type of analysis the
Minnesota statute logically requires.
In sum, whether the basic agreement needs to be in writing
will depend on how broadly courts believe the legislatures in-
tended their respective statutes to apply. Once a court deter-
mines that the statute applies, the court must then decide what
terms need to be in writing.'54 If a legislature has not given ex-
plicit instructions regarding parol evidence, a court should look
to whether only "essential terms" need to be in the written
agreement, or whether the written agreement must contain all
"relevant terms."'55 Unlike "essential," "relevant" is an inclu-
sive term and should be broadly construed to mean any term
that would naturally be included in the written agreement.1 56
3. Fraud
Litigation under the Minnesota statute also indicates that
borrowers will continue to assert fraud claims. In general,
courts have consistently refused to allow a writing requirement
to become a vehicle for fraud, 5 7 and courts should apply this
policy to credit agreement statutes as well. 58 Nevertheless,
courts will need to analyze fraud claims carefully.
Although commentators have noted that it is difficult to re-
duce the law of fraud to firm rules, 5 9 it is clear that fraud re-
written agreement, and any prior or contemporaneous oral agreements be-
tween the parties are superseded by, merged into, and may not vary the credit
agreement."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-4(6)(d) (Supp. 1991) (requiring that a
lender notify the borrower that the credit agreement "is a final expression of
the agreement.., and the written agreement may not be contradicted by evi-
dence of any alleged oral agreement").
154. See supra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing promissory es-
toppel as a defense to the writing requirement of the Statute of Frauds).
158. The Hawaii Conference Committee "emphasize[d] that there is noth-
ing in [the Hawaii statute] which will prevent a successful action against a
lender that commits fraud." HAWAII CONF. Comm. REP. No. 17, at 2 (Apr. 21,
1990); see also Culhane & Gramlich, supra note 29, at 1791, 1797 ("None of the
states, however, have gone so far as to preclude actions based on... fraud....
The Task Force believes it unnecessary to prohibit allegations of fraud.").
159. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 81, § 9-24, at 377-78. The specific el-
ements of fraud vary from state to state, but generally, a party must show that
the speaker knowingly or recklessly made a false, material representation on
which the party relied and, as a consequence, was injured. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTs §§ 525-27, 537-38 (1977). The Restatement states:
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, in-
tention or law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain
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quires a misrepresentation of fact. 6 ° Fronning v. Blume,'6 ' in
which the lender allegedly told the borrower that a mortgage
was merely a description of his farm and had no legal effect,1 62
represents an easy case. If true, this was a clear misrepresenta-
tion of fact.
A case in which the lender does not perform an alleged
oral promise presents a much harder issue for the courts.
Black letter law states that a broken promise is a misrepresen-
tation of fact only if the promise was made with an intent not
to perform. 63 Otherwise, every breach of contract would
amount to fraud.'r The courts that have reviewed Minnesota's
credit agreement statute have sometimes allowed and some-
times disallowed this type of fraud claim.'6 5 The most notewor-
thy of these cases is Norwest Bank Montevideo v. General
Dryer Corp., 6 where the borrower alleged that the lender
orally agreed to continue financing if the borrower turned over
proceeds from a disaster loan. 67 The court summarily dis-
missed the fraud claim, concluding that the statute precluded
it.l 6 8
The court's analysis in General Dryer was incomplete. On
the surface this situation may be hard to distinguish from a
promise which the lender later decides not to perform. How-
ever, in General Dryer, the borrower alleged intentional deceit,
not only as a defense to enforcement of the contract, but also as
from action in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in
deceit for pecuniary loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon
the misrepresentation.
Id- § 525.
160. CALAMARI & PERLLO, supra note 81, § 9-17, at 361; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 162(1)(a) (1979).
161. 429 N.W.2d 310 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
162. Id at 312.
163. CALAMARI & PERILLo, supra note 81, § 9-19, at 365; see also Capital
Bank v. Sorenson, No. C4-90-1122, 1990 WL 211991 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 24,
1990). In Captial Bank, the borrower claimed fraud when the lender refused
to honor an alleged oral agreement to roll over the notes. Id at *2. However,
unless the lender never intended to honor the alleged agreement, there could
be no fraud, only a breach of contract. Moreover, there could be no breach of
contract without a writing because of the credit agreement statute.
164. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 109, at 764 (5th ed. 1984).
165. For example, in Ingvalson v. Habberstad, No. C6-89-46, 1989 WL 84165
(Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 1989), where the borrower alleged that the lender
promised to return the mortgages after a regulatory examination, the court al-
lowed the fraud claim to proceed. Id. at *4.
166. No. C4-89-1986, 1990 WL 48553 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 1990).
167. Id at *1.
168. Id. at *2.
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an independent tort.169 Thus, the borrower necessarily alleged
a misrepresentation of fact, i.e., the lender never intended to
perform the promise to extend additional credit. As such, the
court incorrectly found the statute precluded the claim.
Credit agreement statutes should not protect fraud. How-
ever, courts analyzing fraud claims should determine whether
the borrower is alleging a misrepresentation of fact. A broken
promise is only a misrepresentation of fact if there was no in-
tention to perform at the time the promise was made. If the
borrower alleges a misrepresentation of fact, the court should
allow the claim to stand, either as a defense on the contract or
for an action in tort. This may appear to place a premium on
creative pleading, but the difficulty in proving fraud,170 not the
credit agreement statute, should provide the deterrent to frivo-
lous claims.
B. UNRESOLVED ISSUES
Minnesota courts have not had an opportunity to address
all of the important questions that credit agreement statutes
produce. Moreover, statutes that deviate from the Minnesota
model will raise additional issues. At least one of these issues is
foreseeable: the recognition and interpretation of exceptions to
credit agreement statutes.
The viability of promissory estoppel claims will be of par-
ticular importance in litigation involving the credit agreement
statutes.1 71 Some credit agreement statutes instruct courts in
this regard, 72 while others do not. Absent explicit statutory in-
169. Id. at *1-2. The majority rule is that a writing requirement in no way
affects the validity of a tort action. George N. Stepaniuk, Note, The Statute of
Frauds as a Bar to an Action in Tort for Fraud, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1231,
1234 n.22 (1985) (citing cases).
170. See CALAMARI & PERLLO, supra note 81, § 9-13, at 356.
171. The doctrines of part performance and in-court admissions are other
common law exceptions which may be important also. The Iowa statute, for
example, dictates:
a credit agreement or modification of a credit agreement which is not
in writing, but which is valid in other respects, is enforceable if the
party against whom enforcement is sought admits in court that the
agreement or modification was made, but no agreement or modifica-
tion is enforceable ... beyond the terms admitted.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.17(4) (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
172. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-10-124(3) (Supp. 1991) (prohibiting part
performance and promissory estoppel claims); IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.17(7)
(West Supp. 1991) ('This section entirely displaces principles of common law
and equity that would make or recognize exceptions to or otherwise limit or
dilute the force and effect of its provisions."); OP. REv. STAT. ANN.
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structions, the purpose of the statutes indicates that courts
should entertain, but also carefully scrutinize, estoppel claims.
Promissory estoppel requires justifiable reliance.173 Reli-
ance on an oral promise will not be justifiable if the lender can
show that the borrower knew that only written promises are
enforceable. A sophisticated borrower will undoubtedly be
aware of the statute's general writing requirement. The unso-
phisticated borrowers covered by these statutes' 74 may learn of
the writing requirement from the lender, either because the
statute requires notice or the lender voluntarily provides it.
Therefore, even without an explicit estoppel preclusion, the
writing requirement implicitly limits such actions.175 Neverthe-
less, if the borrower is unaware of the writing requirement and
reasonably relies on the lender's oral assurances, some courts
may permit promissory estoppel claims to proceed. This, too, is
consistent with one purpose of the credit agreement statutes-
protection for unwary borrowers.176 In short, in the absence of
specific statutory instructions, courts should recognize promis-
sory estoppel as an exception to credit agreement statutes but
should also carefully analyze whether the alleged reliance was
justifiable.
C. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
Minnesota's credit agreement statute was one of the first in
the country, and several states have emulated its language.177
Currently, more cases have been decided under the Minnesota
statute than all other credit agreement statutes combined.
Therefore, it is likely that other states, particularly those with
statutes similar to Minnesota's, will look to the Minnesota case
law for some guidance. Courts looking to the Minnesota opin-
ions need to do so with a critical eye. Many of the decisions,
although arguably reaching the proper result, lack a well-rea-
§ 41.580(2)(a) (Butterworth Supp. 1990) (recognizing all traditional Statute of
Frauds exceptions). The model credit agreement statute proposed by the ABA
Task Force on Lender Liability Limitation Amendments to State Statutes of
Frauds recommended that states preclude promissory estoppel actions.
Culhane & Gramlich, supra note 29, at 1792.
173. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 81, § 6-1, at 272.
174. Unsophisticated borrowers are often totally excluded from the stat-
utes' coverage. See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
175. C.f Midland Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. Perranoski, 299 N.W.2d 404,
413 (Minn. 1980) (holding that reliance on oral representations that contradict
a partnership agreement would be unreasonable).
176. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
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soned approach. Principally important, Minnesota courts have
avoided addressing the question of what is a "relevant term'
1 8
and have inconsistently analyzed borrowers' allegations of
fraud. 79 Ironically, Minnesota courts have been relatively sym-
pathetic toward borrowers in determining what terms need to
be in writing, and relatively sympathetic toward lenders in ana-
lyzing fraud claims. An opposite approach is more appropriate.
A lender acting in good faith should be secure in the knowledge
that the written credit agreement contains all legal obligations.
Conversely, a lender acting in bad faith should not be able to
hide behind a credit agreement statute.
CONCLUSION
The proliferation of credit agreement statutes is a positive
development in business law. Professor Llewellyn's fifty-year-
old assessment is more true now than ever-the sophistication
of modern business confirms the need for greater predictability
in contractual liability, and a writing requirement is an effec-
tive device.'80 Courts have a responsibility to interpret these
statutes in a way that will carry out the dual purposes of in-
creasing certainty in contractual relations while also protecting
unwary borrowers.
178. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 161-69 and accompanying text.
180. Llewelyn, supra note 14, at 747.
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